recapitalize and modernize itself for the future while simultaneously meeting current wartime and operations readiness requirements. This paper examines the Navy's ongoing organizational transformation, evaluates the impact of the latest BRAC initiatives on the implementation of the Fleet Readiness Center (FRC) Concept and concludes with an evaluation of the FRC Concept progress and prospects for success.
NAVY'S ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION: SUBSTANTIATIVE CHANGE OR JUST MORE MANAGEMENT HYPE?
It is imperative to develop, nurture, and engage strategic thinkers' at all levels-critical, creative, broad-gauged visionaries with the intellect to dissect the status quo….. Naval Aviation Depots at San Diego, California; Jacksonville, Florida; and Cherry Point, North Carolina survived these BRAC rounds and aviation sustainment activities were consolidated at these depots. These three activities now employ more than 10,000 men and women and are significant contributors to the local communities…both in their economic contributions and also across all community, social and local government arenas.
formed committees and hired lobbyist's to justify and fight for their bases. While local politicians viewed the pending BRAC closures as a catastrophic threat to their local and state economies, the Pentagon viewed the BRAC strategy as necessary and critical to improving both the efficiency and effectiveness of the DoD. 4 Generally, past BRAC closures were tied to capacity-reduction exercises and cost savings. However, the 2005 BRAC was designed around Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld grand strategy for "transforming the Defense Department by rationalizing our infrastructure with our defense strategy." 5 Secretary Rumsfeld made the creation of joint bases a main focus of his strategy. The intent was to force the Services into combining and sharing similar facilities and functions while reducing unneeded redundancy across DoD. He articulated this strategy in his seminal "Bureaucracy to Battlefield" speech delivered at the DoD Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week Kickoff Conference.
During his speech, he declared that our most dangerous enemy was not some external threat but rather a bloated and inefficient Pentagon bureaucracy. The speech and his announced reform efforts were not directed at any of the hard-working DoD employees but rather at the perceived redundant organizations and inefficient and ponderous processes. He described the Pentagon as a place where money disappears as a result of gridlock and where innovation is stifled as a result of outmoded and inefficient processes creating an unmovable and inflexible institution. He referred to his announced efforts to transfer resources (money and personnel) from the pentagon "bureaucracy" to the "battlefield" as a matter of national security. In an era, where dollars are tight and the future is uncertain, the department needs every dime to modernize and transform the U. In retrospect, the Navy began devising its organizational change strategy in late 2003. Not only was the Navy focused on supporting the global war on terrorism, but they had undertaken an initiative to change a culture of consumption to one of cost wise readiness.
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• Theory of Constraints (TOC) is a holistic systems management approach developed by Dr. Eliyahu M. Goldratt.
In 2003, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and the Chief of Naval Air Forces (CNAF), made the decision to reengineer the Navy sites by creating a culture of cost-wise readiness using the management approaches of 'theory of constraints,' lean and six sigma. The enterprise coined this business process reengineering venture -'AIRSpeed.' AIRSpeed is the integration of the following three process-oriented methodologies: 14 The philosophy focuses management attention on a limited number of governing 'constraints' that prevent the 'system' from producing or achieving more of its performance objective. The philosophy spotlights the entire process, identifies the most constraining factor and then develops an intervention strategy that, because of the importance of the limiting constraint, improves the whole system, not just a portion of the system.
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• Lean focuses on streamlining processes to improve throughput while eliminating waste and redundancies throughout the system. The intent is to gain efficiencies across all portions of the process by reducing inventory, duration of activities, amount of effort per task, used space, and manpower.
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• Six sigma is a data-driven methodology, which strives to eliminate defects and to reduce the variability in processes. 17 When combined and aligned in AIRSpeed these three approaches provide a single comprehensive methodology for managing the Naval Air Enterprise by focusing on the most important limiting factors (TOC), efficiencies in the overall process (lean), and the quality/effectiveness of the process/product (six sigma).
AIRSpeed is thus an overall enterprise approach for continuous process improvement which aligns and optimizes Navy maintenance and supply activities to end-user demand (operations). To facilitate management reforms and organizational improvements, the enterprise established multi-functional implementation teams to redesign the sustainment, repair and replenishment processes. These teams were given guidance to cross-over all organizational boundaries, break down any parochial barriers and examine the full range of repair and maintenance activities starting at the detection of a problem at the flightline to the return of the aircraft for tasking. Again the focus was on the entire system and its corresponding component sub-processes. According to the organizational design concept, the FRC will operate within the Out of the six functional areas that were proposed, three of those resulted in significant deviations (see Table 1 ). These deviations have led to increased bureaucracy, conflicting or inefficient processes and disjointed oversight. Although many of the associated negative consequences have been mitigated by the continuous intervention of managers and employees in their efforts to provide support to the warfighter, the deviations have diluted and constrained the transformation change efforts. The challenge for the transformation will be to continue the organizational change momentum to overcome these emerging barriers and continue to improve performance.
John P. Kotter in his book Leading Change provides a useful framework for examining both the Navy's strategy for implementing the organizational transformation to Fleet Readiness Centers and the emerging deviations.
Applying Kotter's Change Model
According to Kotter, 2) Establish a powerful change management team to guide the change effort.
3) Create a compelling vision and associated implementation strategy.
4)
Effectively communicate the change vision, goals and objectives.
5)
Empower broad-based action by granting employees the authority and encouraging the exercise of initiative to implement the strategy and overcome unforeseen obstacles.
6)
Measure progress and generate and advertise short term successes.
7)
Consolidate progress and use it to generate more change.
8)
Anchor new required norms, values and approaches into the organizational culture.
The Naval Aviation Enterprise change management effort reflects Kotter's steps in varying degrees:
1)
Create a sense of urgency. The previous BRAC closures provided a clear example of the consequences of resistance to change. Those organizations that failed to achieve economies and efficiencies and relied on stovepiped parochial interests and institutional inertia to resist streamlining and reforms found themselves the target for subsequent BRAC rounds. For instance, during the 1993 BRAC round the Navy had closed three other sites which resulted in the loss of nearly 12,000 jobs. Management was also acutely aware that the Air Force was proposing that they be made the sole aviation maintenance provider for all services. The Navy recognized that they were going to have to make a compelling case to preserve naval aviation maintenance and gain economies and efficiencies across all maintenance activities. According to Kotter, creating a sense of urgency is imperative to securing the required cooperation of the entire organization. Inherent in developing an effective guiding coalition is to also aggressively eliminate those who surface as opposition to the change efforts. Generally, the higher the level of organizational reform, the more difficult it is to gain support from leaders whose organization is targeted for consolidation, reduction or reduced resourcing. The change management team must be powerful enough to overcome efforts to overtly or covertly block reforms for parochial or political reasons.
As indicated in Table 1 , powerful stakeholders were able to force deviations to the original concept which diluted the change effort.
The primary function of the Fleet Readiness Centers is to produce relevant quality airframes, engines, components, and services to meet the NAE's aircraft ready for tasking (RFT) entitlements at improved efficiency and reduced cost. To perform to entitlement requirements, FRC provides integrated off-flight line repair, in-service industrial scheduled inspections/modifications, and deployable Sea Operational Detachments. 27 Kotter tells us that urgency and a strong guiding coalition are necessary but insufficient conditions for major change. Vision plays a key role in producing useful change by helping to direct, align, and inspire actions on the part of large numbers of people. Without an appropriate vision, a transformation effort can easily dissolve into a list of confusing, incompatible, and time-consuming projects that go in the wrong direction or nowhere at all. 28 The primary function statement was published in the concept of operations. 29 Unfortunately, the strategy changed in the middle of implementation, which created confusion and frustration because many of the supporting plans had to be modified. 30 When senior leadership changed, the strategy changed which had a negative impact on the transformation. Also, there is currently no established overarching strategy for COMFRC. What exist are many different organizations with oversight responsibility providing multiple layers of different visions -all of which are guiding the same activities.
Kotter's strategy tells us that a single vision provides a strong foundation and a unifying path for achieving a successful transformation. 31 An excellent example is the NAE's strategy that transformed five warfare enterprises into a consolidated enterprise with a single fleet driven metric. Unfortunately, the lack of a clear capstone vision and strategy and multiple attendant visions leads to a diluted and confusing message.
Additionally, although many personnel initially participated in numerous kick-off events, there has been little done to continue wide-spread communications of the intent of the transformation throughout the organization. This is despite major reorganizational changes that involved a high degree of personnel turbulence. 33 Senior leaders in both maintenance activities were identified as change agents in specific functional areas. It was these individuals' responsibility to ensure the vision and strategies were communicated throughout the workforce and ensure the performance metrics were being utilized to measure progress.
It was also their responsibility to ensure the identified metrics were being used to measure, report and achieve the BRAC targets successfully. Kotter advises us that each employee will receive 2,300,000 words or numbers in total communications in a three month period. Therefore, he asserts that keeping the communication simple will reduce the amount of time and energy required by change agents to deliver the message. Likewise, Kotter also recommends leaders devise a simple message which is more likely to achieve success than a complicated one that inundates an already overloaded communications stream. 34 Additionally, in order for an organizational strategy to be effective, the organization must form a guiding coalition with the right mix of executives; ones that have strong positional power, extensive expertise and possess high credibility. These coalition members must also possess superb leadership and expert management skills. Combining trust and a common goal shared by managers and employees creates a powerful team that can drive change. 35 In the case of this transformation, not all members of the guiding coalition possessed the requisite skills and experience and thus failed to engender widespread trust and confidence in the prospects for the successful implementation of the concept. 36 In addition, the coalition did not appear to foster the two-communications of shared goals and objectives. The To overcome the organizational cultural impediments to decentralization, the Navy should have developed a specific implementation approach that required managers and employees to receive training on empowerment and also hold the leaders throughout the organization accountable for implementing empowerment measures in both name and spirit. Generally, however, there was limited cross-organizational high visibility, well-attended events designed to advertise short term successes using relevant and unambiguous performance attainment measures directly related to the change effort. These shortterm achievement goals needed to be developed in advance, disseminated, and tracked. They cannot be left to chance or made-up and artificially addressed for publicity purposes only. The visible results should lead logically into the future transformational vision. While the formation and activation of the FRC regional centers were used to advertise 'progress', the associated improvements in efficiencies and effectiveness were generally undersold. 39 This data was available and much more compelling than the mere reorganization of headquarters and commands. Moreover, there was an absence of short-term progress reporting on the higher level headquarters organizational design. As reflected in Table 1 , the alignment of FRCs under CNAF with a dotted management line (which eventually muddled into a weakened Addu relationship with NAVAIR retaining technical authority over the FRCs) diluted unity of command and effort. Kotter specifies that this step, together with the previous five, are essential for building institutional momentum to generate and sustain the change effort through to completion. 40 
7)
Consolidate progress and use it to generate more change. This measure requires periodic and comprehensive assessments of the transformation. Progress must be consolidated by examining all processes, sub-organizations, and procedures to ensure that they are all compatible with a morphing and adapting strategy.
Inconsistencies must be reconciled with an adaption of the system and/or a revision of the vision and strategy. Correspondingly, difficult human resource changes must be made to keep or put the transformation on track. This includes changing leaders who resist the change efforts, modifying hiring and promotion criteria, instituting training and development programs, etc. For the FRC BRAC initiative, functional areas that were unintentionally not addressed were included as those areas became apparent.
However, major new management initiatives, for the most part, were not pursued.
Because of the hierarchical nature of the military oversight, the concept of operation took on an authoritative role in and of itself. More attention was focused on compliance with the concept than critical assessment and re-evaluation of the concept's provisions and associated monitoring criteria. Conversely, the turbulence in military leadership caused by its personnel rotation policies both disrupts continuity but also allows for periodic reviews to update and modify the transformational plan…sometimes with justified changes and sometimes making changes for change-sake. With the FRC BRAC transformation approaching the end of its current implementation planning period (30 September 2010), the entire program is likely primed for a comprehensive consolidation of gains that could address those deviations highlighted in Table 1 The deviations highlighted in Table 1 The rational-analytical model assumes that the problem being analyzed remains somewhat fixed throughout the decision-making process and ultimately into the implementation phase. The polis model recognizes that politics are a major driver and that the decision maker must continuously consider and update problem framing and alternative responses strategies based upon political dynamics and other associated agendas. In the polis model, statements of goals are really statements of desire and are used to gather information on the political viability or, as previously mentioned, to garner political support from other stakeholders. In this light, vagueness is better than precision. Being vague allows potential supporters to 'read in' their own interests as well as leaves a decision maker with 'wiggle room' for later clarification or avoidance. 47 The polis model purports that supporting data can be interpreted, distorted or misapplied to justify or refute almost any alternative according to the self-interests of the stakeholders. As a result, the outcome of a proposal is ultimately determined by the political influences of the stakeholders and not any associated objective supporting data. Although policymakers begin the decision making process by using the rationalanalytical model, our democratic and bureaucratic processes drive the policy makers into the polis framework. Correspondingly, as a result of political influences of powerful stakeholders, not all of the original FRC transformation criteria were implemented during the transformation. Consequently, the Navy senior leadership apparently made modifications to the original headquarters framework in order to retain oversight and organizational authority and to retain or increase manpower and overall budgetary authority. This was at the cost of gaining unity of effort and optimizing potential economies and efficiencies at the higher organizational levels. This diversion of interests and perspectives generated deviations in the execution of the FRC transformation.
Rational-Analytical Model Polis Model

How Bureaucracies Respond to Reduction in Resources and Downsizing
Every bureaucracy responds differently to transformation efforts that portend a reduction of resources and downsizing. A portion of the response depends on the type of business being transformed. For example, Fairris argues that transformations in production environments generally reduces the working conditions of employees at the lowest production level and achieves minimal productivity improvements. 48 Managers respond to pressures for change by adding structures, regardless of increases in administrative cost and complexity, because bureaucratic structure is the legitimate socially prescribed vehicle to accomplish bureaucratic goals. This implies that attempts at major changes in public bureaucracies may lead to more bureaucratic structure and increased costs of administration.
In other words, economies and efficiencies are attempted to be gained by reducing the resources at the lowest working level by trying to do the same or more with less.
Managers seldom begin by reducing the overhead or supporting management staff. If anything, these management resources become even more important, from their perspective, for them to successfully implement the required organizational downsizing.
Similarly, Stevenson argues that managers respond to pressures for change by creating additional organizational structure despite increasing personnel, facilities and administrative expenses of that structure. The bureaucracy naturally responds to performance challenges with more bureaucracy. 49 The Fleet Readiness Center transformation reflects both of these consequences.
However, to date there is no evidence that the transformation has decreased the lower level working conditions or productivity of the workers. In fact, labor productivity has increased quite substantially since the FRC transformation began. This has been tracked through several measures of performance of the combined D-I maintenance activities. Performance data is reported monthly and cost savings are progressing steadily towards the targeted $1.0 billion that the Navy is to produce to achieve the estimated BRAC savings. -Establish another more powerful guiding coalition with the decision authority at the three-star level. Those of the guiding coalition should be held accountable for the completion of any and all transformation action measures. This will eliminate impediments for consolidation and ensure unity of command is achieved.
-Develop and conduct a robust training program for the formation of highly effective cross-functional implementation teams and selected change agents. These change agents would be experts in AIRSpeed process improvement methodology.
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-Develop and implement a comprehensive set of cross-fleet metrics that tracks progress in streamlining management and decentralizing execution.
-Compile an action plan that directly addresses the deviations in the three functional areas of command and control, financial and total force management. One of the limiting factors for effecting reforms in these three areas is the political influence of internal and external stakeholders that have differing views of what changes need to be made. Correspondingly, building consensus within and between these stakeholders on a revised headquarters organizational command and control concept would be an important first step in formulating an effective follow-on action plan.
Conclusion
Leading effective organizational change efforts is a demanding but a quintessential strategic leadership challenge. Driven by limited resources, increasing costs, and external mandates the Navy employed an innovative set of management measures to transform its off-flightline maintenance support. While significant progress has been made, much remains to be accomplished. As noted above, Kotter's eight step process and Stone' polis model provide useful frameworks for understanding and leading transformational change within DoD in general and the Navy in particular.
Together they help identify and explain the deviations from the FRC concept of operations listed in Table 1 and also help frame the way ahead for a new organizational transformation concept.
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